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How do fundamental concepts from economics, such as individuals’
preferences and beliefs, relate to equally fundamental concepts
from psychology, such as relatively stable personality traits? Can
personality traits help us better understand economic behavior
across strategic contexts? We identify an antisocial personality pro-
file and examine the role of strategic context (the “situation”), per-
sonality traits (the “person”), and their interaction on beliefs and
behaviors in trust games. Antisocial individuals exhibit a specific
combination of beliefs and preferences that is difficult to reconcile
with a rational choice approach that assumes that beliefs about
others’ behaviors are formed rationally and therefore, indepen-
dently from preferences. Variations in antisocial personality are as-
sociated with effect sizes that are as large as strong variations in
strategic context. Antisocial individuals have lower trust in others
unless they know that they can punish them. They are also sub-
stantially less trustworthy, believe that others are like themselves,
and respond to the possibility of being sanctioned more strongly,
suggesting that they anticipate severe punishment if they betray
their partner’s trust. Antisocial individuals are not simply acting in
their economic self-interest, because they harshly punish those who
do not reciprocate their trust, although that reduces their economic
payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calculated
manner. Antisocial individuals honor others’ trust significantly less
(if they cannot be punished) but also, harshly punish those who
betray their trust. Overall, it seems that antisocial individuals have
beliefs and behaviors based on a view of the world that assumes
that most others are as antisocial as they themselves are.
trust | antisocial | personality | punishment | person situation
Personality psychology assumes that interindividual differ-ences are systematic and can be explained by personality
traits (1). Personality traits are defined as relatively enduring
patterns of thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors that reflect
an individual’s propensity to “respond in certain ways under
specific circumstances” (2). Consistent with this definition, twin
studies and recent large-scale genome-wide association studies
revealed considerable genetic heritability of personality traits (3–
5), and neuroimaging studies showed consistent correlations
between personality traits and measures of brain structure (6–8)
and brain function (9–11). Furthermore, personality traits re-
main relatively stable for extended periods of time (12, 13) and
predict future academic achievement (14, 15) as well as personal
health and wealth (refs. 16–18; reviewed in ref. 19).
Traditionally, behavior in strategic games has been examined on
the basis of assumptions about the players’ behavioral preferences,
while the broader concept of personality traits—including thoughts
and beliefs systematically tied to traits—has played little role. In
fact, the typical economic analysis of games assumes that beliefs are
not systematically correlated with preferences, because they are
formed rationally and are determined in the equilibrium—beliefs
are thus not a property of the individual but a property of the group
or the equilibrium that the group plays.
Here, we ask whether certain personality traits can help us
better understand behavior in strategic games in which players
face well-structured economic incentives. What is the role of
variations in personality traits compared with relatively large
changes in incentives for individuals’ behavior? Do personality
traits only play a minor role in such an environment, or do
variations in personality “produce” similar behavioral effect sizes
as changes in incentives? To what extent do we observe important
interactions between “the person” (variations in personality traits)
and “the situation” (changes in incentives)? How does the anti-
social personality trait that we identify relate to economic models
of social preferences (20–24)? First, we integrate insights from
economics (19, 25) and personality theory (2, 26, 27) to identify
stable interindividual differences in antisocial personality charac-
teristics. Second, we examine the role of variations in antisocial
personality for behavior in strategic games, and third, we show
how variations in antisocial personality interact with changes in
the strategic nature of the game. We deliberately implement a
large change in the strategic nature of the game such that we can
finally compare the effect sizes resulting from this large change in
the situation with the effect size of variations in personality.
We use various versions of the trust game to study these
questions. The basic trust game involves a sequential one-shot
interaction between an anonymous investor and an anonymous
agent who are both endowed with an identical amount of money
(28). Investors decide how much of their personal monetary
endowment to transfer to their agent; transfers are tripled, and
agents then decide how much of the available money—made up
of the tripled transfer and their initial endowment—they return
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to their investor. In this game, both parties can earn additional
money relative to their endowments, but the investor first has to
trust the agent by transferring money, while the agent has to be
trustworthy and transfer a sufficient amount back to the investor.
The investor’s transfer reflects the “behavioral trust” that the
investor has in the agent, and the agent’s back transfer reflects
the trustworthiness of the agent, who is also free to send back
nothing. The back transfer is thus an indication of the extent to
which the agent is willing to honor the investor’s trust. We in-
troduce several variations to the trust game; the most important
includes the opportunity for the investor to engage in costly
punishment (details are given below). We implement the possi-
bility of sanctioning the agent very harshly, because we are in-
terested in the impact of a large “change in the situation” that can
be compared with the effects of variations in antisocial personality.
Methods Summary and Results
Healthy volunteers (n = 182; 98 females) filled out an online
battery of personality questionnaires (SI Appendix, section S1) and
came to the laboratory approximately 1 wk later. They partici-
pated in four different versions of the trust game and were ran-
domly assigned either the role of the investor (Player P1; n = 90)
or the role of the agent (Player P2; n = 89). Subjects kept the same
role in all four versions of the trust game. Each version of the
game was played for six rounds with randomly assigned anony-
mous partners in each round. There were two main treatments—a
binary trust game without a punishment opportunity [no punish-
ment treatment (NPT)] and a binary trust game with a punishment
opportunity [punishment treatment (PT)]—and two additional
versions of the trust game that were included to ensure the ro-
bustness of our results (SI Appendix, section S2 has details). To
control for any potential order effects, the order in which partic-
ipants faced the trust games was counterbalanced. Furthermore,
we included order effect and first-round dummies in the regres-
sion analyses. To prevent wealth effects, one round was randomly
chosen to be payoff relevant at the end of the session.
In our main analyses, we focus on the differences in behavior
between the PT and the NPT, because this enables us to study
the role of a strong situational factor (“the punishment oppor-
tunity”) and how it interacts with personality characteristics. In
the NPT, the investor (“she”) and the agent (“he”) were each
endowed with Swiss Francs (CHF) 20, and the investor decided
whether to keep the whole endowment or to transfer CHF 10 to
the agent. The transfer amount was tripled, and the agent then
decided how much to transfer back to the investor (back-transfer
amount). The back transfer was not tripled. The PT was identical
to the NPT except that, after the agent made his back-transfer
decision, the investor could punish the agent. For each CHF that
the investor spent on punishment, she reduced the agent’s final
payoff by CHF 5. Because this punishment opportunity enabled
the investor to impose quite harsh sanctions on the agent, we
expected substantial behavioral differences between the NPT
and the PT regardless of subjects’ personality characteristics.
Thus, when we later compare the relative impact of situational
changes with the impact of personality characteristics, we have to
keep in mind that we implemented a strong situational change.
The possible transfer, back transfer, and punishment amounts
in each game are illustrated in SI Appendix, Fig. S2. We imple-
mented the so-called strategy method in both treatments. This
means that agents in the NPT and the PT made a decision about
the back transfer for both possible cases (i.e., for investments of
CHF 0 and CHF 10). These conditional decisions by the agent
were taken before he knew how much the investor had invested.
Likewise, the strategy method in the PT means that the investor
assigns her punishment for each of the agent’s possible back
transfers before knowing his actual back transfer. There is sub-
stantial evidence (29) that the strategy method leads to the same
qualitative behaviors as the “direct response method.” In addition,
it has the advantage of providing data for those parts of the game
tree that are not actually reached (e.g., we also know how much an
investor would punish a back transfer of zero even if the agent’s
actual back transfer is high). We also measured the investor’s belief
about the agent’s back transfer in both the NPT and the PT. These
beliefs were elicited after the investor had made his trust decisions.
Factor Analysis. Given the high dimensionality of our personality
data, we first used factor analysis to reduce the data to the most
essential elements and remove sources of covariance and noise
before entering these data into regression analyses. An explor-
atory factor analysis identified five factors (SI Appendix, Fig. S1),
including (i) emotional reactivity, (ii) antisociality, (iii) sensation
seeking, (iv) anger, and (v) impulsivity (factor loadings are in SI
Appendix, Table S1). We included the standardized factor scores
(Bartlett scores) as explanatory variables in regression models
with the following independent variables: trust (SI Appendix,
Table S2), investors’ beliefs about the agents’ back transfers (SI
Appendix, Table S3), agents’ actual back transfers (SI Appendix,
Table S4), and the investors’ punishment behavior (SI Appendix,
Table S5). All of these regressions also include a treatment
dummy coded as one for the PT and coded as zero for the NPT.
In addition, we controlled for a number of socioeconomic
characteristics and order effects as well as for mood and stress
level, which were measured at the time of the experiment (SI
Appendix, section S1). Since our results hold with and without
these control variables, we do not discuss them in additional
detail. We calculated cluster-robust SEs to account for the panel
structure (within-subject design in which each individual played
six rounds in each treatment). We estimated three different
models for each dependent variable. Model 1 only contains the
treatment dummy PT and control variables. Model 2 adds the
five personality variables, and model 3 further adds the five
personality × PT interactions.
Effects of Antisociality and Punishment Opportunity on Behavioral
Trust. For transfer levels, we find that investors armed with the
option to punish agents are 15 percentage points more likely to
transfer CHF 10 (P < 0.001; mean transfer probability PT:
74.3%; NPT: 60.7%; effect size = 0.15) (SI Appendix, Table S2
shows regression results; SI Appendix, section S3 discusses the
calculation method of standardized effect sizes). In the NPT, an
increase in antisociality leads to a reduction in behavioral trust
(P = 0.085, effect size = 0.10). For example, an individual at the
25th percentile of antisociality has a transfer probability that is
11.5 percentage points higher compared with one at the 75th
percentile of antisociality (assuming average values in all other
personality scores). In addition, the regression indicates a sig-
nificant positive interaction between antisociality and the option
to punish (P = 0.005, effect size = 0.11). Thus, although anti-
social individuals exhibit less behavioral trust in the NPT, anti-
sociality increases the impact of the punishment option on
transfers substantially, raising the impact of the punishment
option by 12 percentage points for a one-SD increase in anti-
sociality. This implies (Fig. 1A) that highly antisocial investors
chose much higher trust levels in the PT compared with the NPT,
and an increase in antisociality is even associated with a small
increase in average transfers in the PT. A similar (but 50%
weaker) positive interaction effect was observed for the anger
factor but not for any other personality factor (SI Appendix, Fig.
S3 and Table S2).
The previous results suggest that antisocial individuals may
have substantially less optimistic beliefs about the agents’ back
transfers unless they are given the option to discipline the part-
ner and both parties know that this option exists.
Effects of Antisociality and Punishment Opportunity on Beliefs About
the Agents’ Back Transfers (“Beliefs About Trustworthiness”). The
roles of the punishment opportunity and of antisocial personality
characteristics on beliefs about back transfers are illustrated in
Fig. 1B and examined in SI Appendix, Table S3. The option to
punish renders investors more optimistic about back transfers
(P < 0.001, effect size = 0.16), and more antisocial individuals
have significantly more pessimistic beliefs about back transfers in
12782 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1820133116 Engelmann et al.
the absence of a punishment opportunity (P = 0.013, effect size =
0.15). A similar main effect of personality was obtained for anger
(SI Appendix, Fig. S4C). Furthermore, we find a significant and
positive interaction, indicating that the impact of the punishment
option on investors’ beliefs increases by roughly two CHF for each
one-SD increase in antisociality (P = 0.001, effect size = 0.12). A
negative and 40% weaker interaction effect was observed for
emotional reactivity (the emotional reactivity factor) but not for
any other personality factor (SI Appendix, Fig. S4 and Table S3).
These results show that more antisocial investors have signif-
icantly less trust in their agents except when they know that they
can punish them. This finding suggests that antisocial individuals
have a particular view about human nature (i.e., they are more
prone to believe that others will not honor their trust unless they
can threaten to punish them).
Effects of Antisociality and Punishment Opportunity on Back
Transfers (“Actual Trustworthiness”). If investors transfer nothing
to the agent, agents’ back transfers are basically zero. The rele-
vant question is, therefore, how the punishment opportunity and
antisociality affect back transfers in case the investors make a
positive transfer. We find first that greater antisociality is asso-
ciated with lower average back-transfer amounts (P = 0.001,
effect size = 0.23) (Fig. 2A and SI Appendix, Table S4). For ex-
ample, an individual at the 25th percentile of antisociality has a
back transfer that is 44% higher compared with one at the 75th
percentile of antisociality (CHF 13.1 vs. CHF 9.1). The lower
back transfers of more antisocial agents in the NPT are not an
artifact of the fact that the investors could only transfer 0 or CHF
10. In the nonbinary trust (NBT) game (without punishment), in
which the investors could invest any amount between 0 and CHF
10, antisociality has an even larger effect (Fig. 2B). If investors
transfer CHF 10 in this trust game, the back transfer of subjects
at the 25th percentile of antisociality is 64% higher than the
transfers of those at the 75th percentile (CHF 13.7 vs. CHF 8.9).
Agents who score high on the anger factor also display lower
back transfers in the NPT, but this effect is smaller than that for
antisociality (P = 0.021, effect size = 0.15) (SI Appendix, Table
S4). Conversely, the punishment option increases average back
transfers relative to the NPT by 30% for all subjects (from CHF
11.30 to CHF 14.90, P < 0.001, effect size = 0.22), and anti-
sociality further increases the positive impact of the punishment
opportunity on back transfers (P = 0.011, effect size = 0.12): a
one-SD increase in antisociality raises the impact of the pun-
ishment opportunity on back transfers from CHF 3.5 to roughly
CHF 5.1 (i.e., by 47%). In fact, the positive interaction effect be-
tween PT and antisociality on back transfers is so strong that the
association between antisociality and back transfers within the PT
(Fig. 2A) becomes rather weak. When punishment is possible,
antisocial individuals are less likely to reciprocate trust, but the
overall effect is small, because the punishment option greatly deters
them. No other personality factor shows a significant interaction
with PT on back transfers (SI Appendix, Fig. S5 and Table S4).
Why do antisocial individuals in the role of the agent respond
so much more strongly to the punishment opportunity? One
possibility is that antisocial individuals display different punish-
ment patterns and—when in the role of agents—use introspection
into how they would punish to form their expectations about the
likelihood of being punished for low back transfers. If this hy-
pothesis is correct, we should observe that antisocial individuals
display harsher punishments for a lack of reciprocation to positive
transfers. The punishment pattern is also interesting for another
reason, because those who punish only incur a material cost
without reaping any reputational or material benefit from the
punishment in our experimental setup. Thus, investors who punish
clearly do not maximize their own economic benefits. The pun-
ishment option, therefore, enables us to assess an important as-
pect of the nature of antisociality: is it merely an extreme form of
selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior, or does it represent a form of
malevolence in the sense that antisocial individuals display a high
willingness to betray other individuals’ trust while simultaneously
imposing very harsh punishments on those who betray their trust,
although these punishments yield no benefits but are instead,
costly for them?
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Fig. 1. Investors’ transfers (A) and beliefs about back transfers (B) as a function of punishment condition (absent vs. present) and antisocial personality scores.
Dots (n = 90) indicate individual investors’ predicted probability of transferring CHF 10 (A) and their predicted beliefs about the agents’ back transfers (B) in
the NPT and the PT. The predictions are based on model 3 in SI Appendix, Table S2 (A) and SI Appendix, Table S3 (B) and individuals’ scores across all
personality factors. Solid/dashed lines indicate fitted values (A is based on model 3 in SI Appendix, Table S2, and B is based on model 3 in SI Appendix, Table
S3). All covariates [(except for antisociality score and treatment (PT and NPT)] were fixed at their means. In the absence of punishment (NPT), a decrease in
antisociality (e.g., from the 75th to the 25th percentile) is associated with an increase in transfer probability by 20% (from 56.9 to 68.4%; P = 0.085) and an
increase in the expected back transfer by 27% (from CHF 9.3 to CHF 11.8; P = 0.013). Conversely, when the punishment option is present (PT), the antisocial
investors have even a somewhat higher transfer probability and slightly more optimistic back-transfer expectations. This is due to a relatively strong in-
teraction between antisociality and the punishment option (P = 0.005) (SI Appendix, Table S2): for every one-SD increase in antisociality, the PT effect on
transfers (and expected back transfers) increases by 12 percentage points (and CHF 2.1). None of the other personality traits have a significant interaction with
PT for transfers (SI Appendix, Fig. S3 and Table S2). For beliefs, only emotional reactivity shows a significant interaction with PT (SI Appendix, Fig. S4 and Table
S3) such that individuals with low emotional reactivity expect significantly larger back transfers in PT. ANTI, antisociality.
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Effects of Antisociality on Costly Punishment. For punishment, we
estimated models that can capture a nonlinear relationship be-
tween the size of the back transfer and the punishment imposed
on the agent. The reason is that the severity of the punishment
may be particularly high for very low back-transfer levels. Fig. 3
and SI Appendix, Fig. S7 indicate that this is indeed the case. We
borrowed the candidate functions for capturing this nonlinearity
from research on intertemporal choice behavior that uses non-
linear least squares regression (30, 31). A model comparison
revealed that a quasihyperbolic, double-exponential functional
model best fits the data (SI Appendix, Eq. S5 and Fig. S7; a
model comparison is in SI Appendix, Table S6). The slope
coefficients for back-transfer levels (coefficients for back
transfer 1 and 2 are in SI Appendix, Table S5) and Fig. 3 in-
dicate that there is substantial average punishment at a back
transfer of zero that declines nonlinearly until a back transfer
of CHF 25; there is little average punishment for higher back
transfers. Interestingly, highly antisocial individuals punish low
back transfers much more harshly than individuals with low
levels of antisociality. Individuals at the 75th percentile of
antisociality spend more than twice as much to punish back
transfers of zero compared with individuals at the 25th per-
centile (CHF 4.7 vs. CHF 2.3) (Fig. 3). Statistically, the effect
of antisociality on punishment shows up through a positive
effect on the intercept (P < 0.001, effect size = 0.35) and a
significant negative interaction between antisociality and back
transfer 2 (P = 0.016, effect size = 0.13), which indicates the
steeper decline of punishment as back transfers increase (SI
Appendix, Table S5). Finally, a similar main effect of person-
ality was obtained for impulsivity (SI Appendix, Fig. S6B), but
the size of the effect is approximately one-half as large as that
for antisociality.
For the interpretation of the punishment behavior, it is im-
portant to keep two points in mind. First, we used the strategy
method for eliciting the investors’ sanctions (i.e., the investors
made the punishment decision in an emotionally “cold” state
in which they did not know whether their agent had in fact
chosen a low back transfer). Second, the investors decided on the
punishment of an individual whom they did not know and would
not meet again during the experimental session. Thus, the in-
vestors could not derive any pecuniary benefit from punishing,
and they determined their punishment in a “cold,” “calcu-
lative” state, assigning a punishment amount for each possible
back-transfer level.
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Control Analyses. A set of control analyses is reported in SI Ap-
pendix that checks the robustness and ecological validity of the
results reported above. Results from these analyses indicate that
differences in emotional arousal across game contexts (SI Ap-
pendix, section S5 and Table S7), the limited transfer options in
the binary game context (SI Appendix, section S6, Fig. S8, and
Tables S8 and S9), risk attitudes (SI Appendix, section S7 and
Tables S10–S12), and cognitive ability (SI Appendix, section S8
and Table S13) likely do not drive the effects reported above.
Situational Vs. Personality Variables.Our setup makes it possible to
examine the relative effect sizes of changes in the situation (PT
vs. NPT) and changes in antisocial personality scores. We com-
puted standardized effect sizes that make such a comparison
possible in Fig. 4. Fig. 4 shows that variations in personality
generally have a very similar effect size compared with the
changes induced by the punishment option. In this context, it is
worthwhile to mention that the PT introduces a very strong
punishment opportunity that enables the investors to impose
large sanctions on the agents. Therefore, if the personality var-
iables show similar effect sizes, one may view this as a strong
result. In fact, the strongest effect size emerges within the PT,
where antisocial individuals impose considerably harsher sanctions
on agents who provide low back transfers (effect size = 0.35). It is
also interesting that significant interactions between the situation
and antisocial personality scores exist for major dependent vari-
ables—investors’ transfers, investors’ beliefs about back transfers,
and the agents’ actual back transfers. The identification of anti-
social personality profiles thus makes it possible to understand the
behavioral changes that occur when a punishment option is in-
troduced at a much deeper level, as they interact in important
ways with individuals’ level of antisociality.
Discussion and Conclusions
Personality traits are defined as relatively enduring patterns of
people’s thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors (i.e., thoughts and be-
liefs are considered a fundamental part of an individual’s per-
sonality from this perspective) (32). This view contrasts with the
prevalent assumption in economics, where preferences are
viewed as an individual characteristic, while beliefs are a prop-
erty of the equilibrium and are often assumed to be formed ra-
tionally on the basis of the available evidence. This means that
there should be no systematic relationship between what people
believe about others’ behavior and their own preferences. We
should thus not expect a systematic correlation between indi-
viduals’ social preferences and individuals’ beliefs about their
partner’s behavior in a trust game.
Here, we used well-validated self-report measures from per-
sonality psychology to identify an antisocial personality profile
that shows a systematic correlation between the beliefs of anti-
social individuals and their behaviors. Moreover, no current
theory of social preferences (in which pure selfishness is a special
case) seems to be able to account for the belief–behavior pat-
terns of the antisocial individuals. Antisocial individuals have
high positive loadings on Machiavellianism and high negative
loadings on empathy, trustworthiness, and agreeableness. Anti-
social investors in the NPT believe that their agents’ will be
considerably less likely to honor their trust compared with investors
with low antisociality. Accordingly, highly antisocial investors also
exhibit less behavioral trust than prosocial investors. Interestingly,
however, if investors can punish their agents, highly antisocial in-
vestors respond to the punishment option with their beliefs and
transfers much more strongly than prosocial investors: they be-
come much more optimistic about their agents’ back transfers, and
they exhibit much more behavioral trust relative to a situation
without a punishment option.
Why do antisocial investors respond so differently to the ex-
istence of a punishment option? A plausible reason is that they
take their own behavioral response to the punishment option
into account and assume that other individuals—their agents—
respond like they do. We observe, in fact, that antisocial
individuals in the role of agents respond much more strongly to
the punishment option by increasing their back transfers relative
to a situation without punishment. Thus, when antisocial inves-
tors put themselves into their agents’ shoes and take their own
likely response to the punishment option into account when
predicting their agents’ back transfers, they should become more
optimistic, and they have reason to show more behavioral trust.
However, why do antisocial agents respond so strongly to the
presence of a punishment option? Again, a plausible reason is
that antisocial agents may introspect into how they would punish
agents if they were in the role of an investor who could punish. In
fact, antisocial investors indeed punish agents who provide low
back transfers much more severely compared with more proso-
cial investors, and they do so not in a “hot” state after their trust
has actually been betrayed but in a “cold” state, in which they
assign their sanctions to each possible back-transfer level ex ante
(i.e., before they know their agent’s back transfer). Therefore, if
antisocial agents project their own harsh sanction—if they were
an investor—to their actual investors, it makes sense for them to
respond more strongly to the punishment option by raising their
back transfers. The overall picture that emerges is thus consistent
with the idea that highly antisocial individuals believe that their
partners in the trust game will behave similarly to how they
themselves would in the other role.
No economic theory of social preferences predicts such a
correlation between what antisocial individuals believe and the
preferences that antisocial individuals reveal in the NPT and the
PT. Note that a clean identification of behavioral preferences is
only possible for agents in the NPT and for the investors at the
punishment stage of the PT, because the respective players make
the last move in the game in these situations, and their behavior,
therefore, does not depend on beliefs about their opponents’
responses but only on their preferences.
These behavioral data clearly show that antisocial individuals
are not simply selfish, because they still show significantly posi-
tive back transfers if the investor transfers CHF 10. They spend a
Fig. 4. Standardized effect sizes (SI Appendix, section S3 has the calculation
method) of changes in the situation (PT vs. NPT), variations in the antisocial
personality scores and their interaction on investors’ behavioral trust, in-
vestors’ beliefs in back transfers, and agents’ actual back transfers. Fur-
thermore, we also show the effect size of the antisociality score on investors’
punishment behaviors. Variations in antisocial personality scores have effect
sizes that are quite comparable with the effect size of a punishment option
that enables investors to impose severe sanctions on agents (for every CHF
that the investor spends on punishment, the agent loses CHF 5). For be-
havioral trust, the effect size of the situational variable (PT vs. NPT) is
somewhat larger than the effect size for antisocial personality, while the
effect size of the situational variable is almost identical to the personality
variable for investors’ expected back transfers and agents’ actual back
transfers. However, by far, the biggest effect emerges for the personality
effect on investors’ punishment. In addition, we observe significant inter-
actions between the situational variable and the personality variable.
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lot of resources on the sanctioning of those agents who make low
back transfers, although they derive no pecuniary benefit from
this. Antisocial individuals are less trustworthy and less willing to
honor others’ trust, but they are not complete defectors. These
data also imply that antisocial individuals do not simply have en-
vious or spiteful preferences in the sense that they unconditionally
value the other players’ payoffs negatively, because such prefer-
ences would imply unconditional back transfers of zero in the trust
game without punishment, and they would be hard to reconcile
with the fact that antisocial individuals condition their sanctions
on the agents’ back-transfer levels. Individuals who are simply
envious or spiteful would always—regardless of the agents’ back
transfer—exploit the opportunity to reduce others’ material pay-
offs. The behavioral preferences revealed by the agents in the NPT
are consistent with weak preferences for reciprocity (20, 23, 24) or
a weak aversion against advantageous inequality (21). In contrast,
the behavior of antisocial investors at the punishment stage is
consistent with a strong preference for negative reciprocity (20,
23, 24) or a strong aversion against disadvantageous inequality
(21). However, neither theories of reciprocity nor the theory of
inequity aversion explain why these antisocial individuals seem to
have quite different beliefs compared with less antisocial individ-
uals. Nevertheless, their belief–behavior pattern is coherent and
makes sense if these individuals assume that most others are similar
to themselves (i.e., exhibit a low willingness to honor others’ trust
but a high willingness to punish others if their trust is not honored).
In fact, this process of simulating one’s own thoughts, feelings, and
intentions within a hypothetical scenario to make predictions about
others’ behavior is referred to as self-projection (33), and there is
considerable support from social neuroeconomics that investors
utilize the neural processes that enable self-projection when mak-
ing decisions in trust and similar games (34–36).
The more general lesson from our research is perhaps that
beliefs may be a property of the individual as much as preferences
are and that certain belief–behavior patterns may be associated
with certain personality characteristics. The psychology of person-
ality traits may thus help in constraining the assumptions that
one can or should make about what people believe about others.
In addition, our research shows that variations in personality can
be as important as variations in “the situation” and that impor-
tant interactions between personality characteristics and situa-
tional features exist (2, 19, 25–27).
Materials and Methods
Participants. In total, 182 volunteers from various universities in Zurich par-
ticipated. Students with a background in economics and psychology were
excluded to avoid potential decision biases. Three participants were removed
from additional analyses (i) due to technical problems and (ii) because
personality scores identified them as outliers (final n = 179). Participants
gave written and informed consent, and all experimental procedures were
approved by the ethics committee of the Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, University of Zurich.
Procedure. First, participants filled out an online battery of personality
questionnaires several days (M ± SD = 5.0 ± 3.2) before the experiment
(SI Appendix, section S1). Second, they were invited to the University of
Zurich Behavioral Economics laboratory and randomly assigned to the role
of either the investor or agent. Each participant completed six rounds of
each trust game treatment in pseudorandom order: the NPT and the PT
outlined in SI Appendix, Fig. S1 as well as an NBT and a direct feedback
treatment. Additional information is provided in SI Appendix, section S2.
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